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 Significant ethical issues arise in the context of military policies and genetics.  
Advancement in biotechnology has generated unfathomable insight into the role of the human 
genome on health. The U.S. Military routinely collects genetic information and conducts genetic 
testing but is not subject to some of the protections afforded civilians.  The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 was a preemptive civil rights law that sought to prohibit 
genetic discrimination, but the U.S. Military is exempt from complying with GINA standards for 
employment nondiscrimination. I argue that it is unethical for servicemembers to undergo 
mandatory genetic testing and screening in the absence of robust protection of genetic 
information and against discrimination. In order to identify ethical issues that are significantly 
different in the military vs. the civilian context, I will here explore the role of current military 
practice, including TRICARE health insurance, the Disability Evaluation System, human subjects 
protections for military personnel, required genetic and health screens, and Department of 
Defense and branch-specific genetic information policies. Then, I will illuminate the ethical 
obligations of the military institution and the duty to protect the individual servicemember. In 
this paper, I draw on three unique cases that convey different ways in which military personnel 
are vulnerable to genetic discrimination. I will offer an ethical analysis of perceived benefits and 
harms of using genetic information in each of the three cases, drawing on the principles of 
autonomy, non-maleficence and justice.  Specifically, I argue that: (1) due to the all-
encompassing demands of the U.S. Military and the control it wields over the lives of 
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servicemembers, the military has an obligation to promote what little autonomy 
servicemembers have, (2) the principle of nonmaleficence is violated by the consequences of 
mandatory genetic screening, which primarily constitute career repercussions and emotional 
distress, and (3) mandated genetic screenings in the absence of rigorous genetic information 
protection policy is unjust because servicemembers comprise a vulnerable population. I 
conclude that the harms of exempting the U.S. Military from GINA outweigh the perceived 
benefits and suggest an opportunity to reframe genetic information protection and 
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 The field of genetics has grown exponentially in the past half century, giving rise to 
incredible technologies and insight into our own genetic composition. The Human Genome 
Project completed its 13-year mission in April of 2003, producing a fully sequenced blueprint for 
human DNA and launching civilization into the genetic revolution. This advancement fostered 
the emergence of personalized medicine, in which diagnoses and treatments can be tailored to 
individual patients in order to maximize safety and efficacy. Buried ancestry information and 
insight into one’s genetic composition became widely accessible via direct-to-consumer genetic 
testing. These innovations did not come without consequences, as genetic discrimination and 
the emotional toll of seemingly deterministic information outpaced ethical conduct and policy 
development. Cultivating a scientific understanding and application of genetic knowledge posed 
an important ethical question regarding ownership and use of one’s genetic information. To 
protect against potential misuse of this information, the US Senate enacted a preemptive civil 
rights bill in 2008, called the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA). However, GINA 
fails to protect servicemembers (SM) in the U.S. Military. This exemption allows for the U.S. 
Military to require genetic screening and testing of several genes of interest for all SM, 
prospective and current.  In lieu of prohibitive legislation, military personnel are subjected to 
mandatory genetic testing that can impact eligibility, occupational specialty, forced retirement, 
and disability benefits. 
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 In this thesis, I argue that it is unethical for SM to undergo mandatory genetic testing 
and screening in the absence of robust protection of genetic information. First, I will describe 
current standards of practice within the U.S. Military, including TRICARE health insurance, the 
Disability Evaluation System (DES), human subjects protections for military personnel, required 
genetic and health screens, and Department of Defense (DoD) and branch specific policies 
regarding genetic information. Next, I will raise general ethics issues that arise in the military 
not specific to genetics. I will discuss the ethical obligations of the military, including the duty to 
protect, and demonstrate how military personnel comprise a vulnerable population by 
introducing three cases that expose different vulnerabilities corresponding to different 
timepoints along an SM’s career. Finally, I will offer an ethical analysis of benefits and harms of 
using genetic information in each of the three cases, drawing on the principles of autonomy, 
non-maleficence and justice.  Specifically, I will argue that: (1) due to the all-encompassing 
demands of the U.S. Military and the control it wields over the lives of SM, the military has an 
obligation to promote what little autonomy SM have, (2) the principle of nonmaleficence is 
violated by the consequences of mandatory genetic screening, which primarily constitute 
career repercussions and emotional distress rather than medical benefits, and (3) mandated 
genetic screenings without detailed and rigorous genetic information protection policy is unjust 
because SM comprise a vulnerable population. Finally, I will conclude that the harms of 
exempting the U.S. Military from GINA outweigh the benefits and suggest an opportunity to 
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reframe genetic information protection and nondiscrimination into more rigorous and military-
specific policy. 
 
2. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (2008) 
 
2.1. Background 
 In 2008, the United States passed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA), protecting Americans from discrimination by health insurance and employers based on 
genetic make-up. Genetic information was defined by GINA as, “family medical history, 
manifest disease in family members, and information regarding individuals' and family 
members' genetic tests.” This act prohibits employers and health insurance companies from 
requiring genetic testing or making decisions based on genetic information alone. Many states 
have their own laws regarding genetic discrimination, some rigorous and some weak- GINA is 
designed to establish a standardized protection against genetic discrimination for all Americans 
to which all relevant entities must comply. There are two main components to GINA: the first 
outlines the restrictions preventing genetic discrimination by health insurance, and the second 
prohibits genetically discriminatory actions or decisions by employers. 
Title I covers health insurers or health plan administrators, preventing them from 
requesting or requiring genetic information of an individual or an individual's family members, 
or using such information for decisions regarding coverage, rates, or preexisting conditions. 
 4 
However, this does not apply to life, long-term, or disability insurance policies. 
Additionally, GINA includes a, ‘research exception,’ that allows health insurers and group health 
plans engaged in research to request (but not require) that an individual undergo a genetic test. 
Title II covers employment, prohibiting employers from using genetic information for 
hiring, firing, or promotion decisions, and for any decisions regarding terms of employment. 
However, federal government employers such as the U.S Military are exempt from adhering to 
these protections. 
Though there have been a few cases of genetic discrimination, GINA was not intended 
to serve as a response to instances of unethical misconduct. Rather, it was designed to prevent 
such occurrences of discrimination from happening at all. 
 
2.2. Limitations 
 Title II of GINA covers the legal obligations of relevant entities to comply with the 
prohibition of genetic discrimination in considering offers of employment. This section contains 
an exemption that will be the focus of this thesis.  It states that the employment protections 
offered by GINA do not extend to the U.S. Military or federal employees. This means that the 
military may make employment decisions based on genetic information. It is important to note 
that GINA takes the form of a negative right. Per GINA, American civilians are granted freedom 
from genetic discrimination, they are not granted access to special accommodations due to 
genetic differences. We can compare this to the American’s with Disabilities Act (1990) which 
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prohibits discrimination based on disability and guarantees accommodations to improve the 
public and private environment for people with disabilities. This is an important distinction that 
will inform the shape that future military policy ought to take, and will be discussed further in 
Sections 6.2 and 7.6. 
 
3. Current Military Practice 
 
 In order to orient the reader to the ethical dilemma at hand, it is necessary to describe 
pertinent information about military procedures and policies that is distinct from those relevant 
to civilians. 
 
3.1. Medical Standards 
The U.S. Military enjoys allowances when it comes to genetic information that other 
employers do not have for many reasons having to do with the strength of the military 
institution and the need to protect service members. All U.S. military branches have utilized 
medical disqualifiers in the screening process for Americans interested in joining the service 
long before genetic disqualifiers came into existence. For example, if someone has diabetes 
mellitus, anemia, or even a peanut allergy, they may be subject to dismissal from the screening 
process and deemed ineligible for service. Medical standards are part of the determination of 
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fitness for duty and must be met annually throughout the career of an SM in order to continue 
component operations.  
 
3.2. TRICARE Insurance 
TRICARE Health Plan is the health insurance program for U.S. Military SM. All SM are 
eligible to participate in TRICARE insurance, in fact, all active-duty SM are required to be 
covered. TRICARE health insurance operates nearly identically to its private health insurance 
counterparts. Similar to private health insurance, TRICARE plans have annual premiums, 
deductibles, catastrophic caps, and out of pocket costs. For participating TRICARE members, 
TRICARE itself falls under the Title I protections of GINA concerning health insurance, 
preventing coverage consideration, underwriting, or premium setting on the basis of genetic 
information.  
One of the main ethical concerns raised by the U.S. Military exemption from GINA is the 
inconsistency promising to protect TRICARE members within Title I and the ability for the 
military to determine who may acquire that membership through offers of employment, 
ultimately restricting access to TRICARE health insurance. Eligibility for TRICARE is contingent on 
an offer of employment from the armed forces or familial relationship to an SM. The lack of 
nondiscrimination protections afforded to the employment process for the U.S. Military can 
indirectly limit an individual from enrolling in a health insurance plan (TRICARE). Therefore, 
genetic information may affect one’s ability to access TRICARE health insurance.  
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3.3. Disability Evaluation System (DES) 
 The Disability Evaluation System (DES) determines the fitness for duty, separation, or 
retirement due to disability. This process may remove an SM from service, provide financial 
disability benefits, or determine a lack of causation between military service and disability. In 
the event that an SM is recommended for discharge, separation, or forced retirement, access to 
TRICARE halts and the DES collaborates with Veteran Affairs on continuity of health care. The 
VA Benefits Delivery at Discharge program exists to help ease this transition, offering legal and 
policy guidance in order to extract maximum benefits from the VA Health system. The Veteran 
Affairs Schedule for Rating Disabilities (VASRD) is used as a calculator of a sort to determine 
how severely the SM’s condition impedes their ability to work, care for themselves, and care for 
family. The VASRD is especially important in referring SM with congenital or developmental 
defects to the DES, as they must demonstrate that military service aggravated or super-
imposed disease. A SM’s disability or disease is not compensable if it is viewed as the result of a 
preexisting condition. This can be especially problematic with the presence of unknown genetic 
conditions manifesting during military service, complicating the causal agent responsible for 
symptoms. This will be expanded upon in Sections 3.6 and 4. 
 
3.4. Human Subjects Protections of Military Personnel Undergoing Experimental Treatment 
It is DoD policy that military personnel be provided the best possible medical prevention 
and treatments while operating under assignment, which includes countermeasures to 
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chemical, biological, or radiological warfare or terrorism and public health threats. In order to 
fulfill such an obligation, the DoD collaborates with the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to 
provide SM with the best possible medical care through force health protection programs, 
military-specific Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) and Investigational New Drug (IND) 
applications. Procedures surrounding the option to refuse investigational treatments or obtain 
a waiver of informed consent are unique to the military and ought to be understood in the 
broader context of research ethics.  
 Military-specific EUA forms permit implementation of an unapproved medical 
countermeasure in response to a declaration of emergency issued by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services. If the EUA that is granted provides recipients the option to refuse 
administration of the product, the President, upon request from the Secretary of Defense, may 
grant a waiver of an option to refuse to SM (E3.4, DoDI 6200.02, 2008). Such a waiver would 
eliminate SM choice with regard to whether they want to undergo the investigational 
treatment, effectively requiring military personnel to participate in research. 
 IND protocols are used in research involving a drug or medical device for novel use in 
preventing or treating illness and are subject to FDA regulations. The President, per request 
from the Secretary of Defense, may grant a waiver of informed consent to use an IND on SM 
within particular military operations. Circumventing the informed consent process is atypical in 
the context of human subjects research involving civilians. But in the military, a waiver of 
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informed consent is justified if the President determines that, “obtaining informed consent is 
not in the interest of national security,” (E4.2, DoDI 6200.02, 2008). 
 The involvement of military personnel in research has been of some interest in recent 
history, especially concerning the relationship between the hierarchical nature of the 
organization and the risk of undue inducement or coercion. The Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR 45 part 46) Protection of Human Subjects describe special protections and criteria for 
vulnerable groups, recognizing the power dynamic at play within the military, and ensure 
additional safeguards that strive to protect the rights and welfare of study subjects. 
Additionally, the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 
(1994) emphasized the importance of voluntariness in military personnel research and 
recommended that officers be excluded from recruitment in order to mitigate coercion and 
undue inducement.  
 The ethical obligations of the military to national security and to the individual SM will 
be discussed further in Section 5, but it here the point is to introduce the reader to current 
practices in the military regarding investigational treatments. In general, power dominates in 
the military, governing all decisions concerning SM and overriding their autonomy. The role of 
power will be discussed further in classifying military personnel as a vulnerable population in 
bioethics. 
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3.5. Health and Genetic Testing & Screening Procedures and Policies 
 Genetic screening is among the biotechnology advancements adopted by the military in 
order to improve the safety of SM. Other technologies, such as unmanned drones, have 
demonstrated the benefits of technology in war circumstances in reducing the risk of soldiers 
and airmen in the combat zone. Genetic screening is another response to adapting the 
exponentially growing field of biotechnology to the U.S. Military’s advantage. All U.S. Military 
branches currently require genetic screening for two gene variants (G6PD and SCT), both 
associated with increased risk in a particular combat zone. The test results affect the 
occupational specialty and may entitle the SM to health support or educational programming to 
mitigate the risk assumed by the presence of the gene variant. Additional educational 
programming, training support, and occupational accommodations are made for individuals 
who screen positive for either of these genetic tests. 
 
 3.5.1. G6PD: Glucose 6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G6PD) deficiency is associated with 
the decreased ability to metabolize certain drugs, particularly anti-malarial pharmaceuticals. All 
personnel entering or on active duty in the Military Services are screened for the presence of G6PD 
deficiency and results are documented in their electronic health record in accordance with DoDI 
6040.45. Someone with a G6PD deficiency may be particularly at risk in malaria-prevalent 
combat zones, guiding tour deployments and international assignments. 
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 3.5.2. SCT: The second screen is for sickle cell trait (SCT), which can manifest as sickle 
cell disease if both recessive alleles are present. While a history of sickle cell disease can 
disqualify a candidate from the recruitment process, presence of SCT is not a disqualifying 
condition. An SCT carrier will have one recessive allele and one dominant allele, and is at 
decreased risk for malarial infection. Conflicting evidence over the years has weakened any link 
between SCT and increased risk for mortality, but is still currently part of the screening process. 
Sickle cell trait screening will be done only on SM who meet demographic, clinical, or operational 
criteria. The results of testing must be documented in the SM’s Electronic Health Record.  
 In contrast with genetic screening, the US Army requires their SM to undergo HIV 
screening every two years as a part of preventative medicine. In the instance of a positive HIV 
result, SM are supported by trained HIV counselors. HIV is not a disqualifying condition, but it 
does have significant implications for SM assignments and military occupational specialty 
(MOS). For example, the HIV positive SM may be restricted from artillery or infantry positions 
and may not be deployed to a combat zone. Such measures are justified on public health 
grounds: to mitigate the spread of disease and to protect other soldiers in the event of a blood-
exposure as a result of trauma or via a one-to-one emergency blood transfusion in the combat 
zone. Due to the distinct public health rationale for HIV screening, it is not different from 
genetic screening for G6PD-deficiency and SCT. Mandatory HIV screening is justified as a 
necessary violation of autonomy to protect the autonomy of those surrounding you. The same 
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cannot be said for G6PD and SCT screening. Therefore, the ethical issues raised by mandatory 
genetic screening are distinct from other mandatory medical screening in the armed forces. 
 
3.6. DoD and Branch Policy on Genetic Information 
The DoD does not have any policies that protect genetic information or prevent genetic 
discrimination. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, issued a memorandum 
warning against SM use of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing (2019). In this advisory, 
military personnel were warned against DTC selling tactics, offering incentives like military 
discounts. The office accuses DTC genetic tests of being largely unregulated and asserts that 
exposure of sensitive genetic information can adversely affect personal and operational risks, in 
part due to the obligation to disclose medical information that threatens fitness for duty. The 
memo raises important ethical issues with DTC genetic testing, but fails to elaborate on the role 
of genetic information in military operations. 
Genetics is rarely mentioned in DoD Instructions and Directives. Currently, it appears 
that the main role genetics plays in DoD operations is contributing to the Disability Evaluation 
System. Within the evidentiary standards for determining compensability of unfitting 
conditions, the presumption of sound condition for active-duty members includes: 
Any hereditary or genetic disease will be evaluated to determine whether clear and 
unmistakable evidence demonstrates the disability existed before the Service member’s 
entrance on active duty and was not aggravated by their current period of military service. 
However, even if the disability is determined to have been incurred prior to entry on their 
current period of active duty, any aggravation of that disease, incurred during the Service 
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members current period of active duty, beyond that determined to be due to natural 
progression will be determined to be service-aggravated. (DoDI 1332.18, 2018) 
  
The idea of implicating genetic conditions as causes of symptoms and disability is not 
elaborated on within DoD instructions, but will be further discussed in Section 4 as an 
important source of vulnerability. 
 Although the DoD has not instituted any broad genetic nondiscrimination policies to 
protect SM, the U.S. Air Force does make explicit reference to genetic nondiscrimination in 
their equal opportunity policies. As a response to data revealing structural discrimination and 
injustice within the Air Force, the branch updated its Employment Opportunities Program to 
prohibit a broader range of discriminations that could arise among its personnel: 
 Air Force Equal Opportunity (EO) Program (1.1.1) 
It is against Air Force policy for any Airman, military or civilian, to unlawfully discriminate 
against, harass, intimidate or threaten another Airman on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
national origin, age, disability, reprisal, or genetic information... Unlawful harassment also 
includes creating an intimidating, hostile working environment. The use of disparaging terms 
with respect to a person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic 
information contributes to a hostile work environment and must not be tolerated. Commanders 
and supervisors should ensure all types of harassment are corrected as soon as possible once 
they are made aware. 
  
This airmen nondiscrimination policy explicitly prohibits interpersonal discrimination on 
the grounds of genetic information.  This will be discussed further in Sections 6.3.2 and 7.6. 
 In short, the current U.S. Military practices involving medical fitness, disability, and 
genetic screening demonstrate that genetic information plays a significant role in the health 
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and wellness status of the SM, and does so in the absence of genetic information protection 
and nondiscrimination policies. The absence of such protections is of particular concern from an 
ethical perspective since SM are a vulnerable population. 
 
4. U.S. Military Personnel as a Vulnerable Population 
The concept of vulnerability in bioethics refers to an unusually high susceptibility to 
harm due to some sort of group membership or shared characteristic. Traditionally, an 
increased risk of harm can result from (1) exceptionally hazardous situations and/or (2) 
decreased capacity to safeguard one’s own interests, controls, or capabilities (Rogers, 2013). 
Since SM fulfill both criteria, they qualify as a vulnerable population. The nature of the 
occupation exposes SM to unusually dangerous situations. Whether it is in handling weapons or 
operating in a combat zone, danger is part of the job. Moreover, the hierarchical organization 
of the U.S. Military is characterized by an unavoidable power imbalance that can have 
discriminatory and exploitative consequences.   
The literature identifies several different types of vulnerability (Kipnis,2003), two of 
which are particularly applicable to the SM population. The first vulnerability is juridic: does the 
subject answer to an authority who may have an independent interest in that participation? 
The relationship between a military officer and enlisted member is a stark example of formal 
and structural subordination. The same can be said of any SM of inferior ranking to another— 
they assume a role of subordination to authority. This can both fuel instances of harassment or 
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discrimination and silence complaints or accusations of such behaviors. The second type of 
vulnerability is deferential: does the subject exhibit deferential behavior that masks an 
underlying unwillingness to participate? Similar to the juridic vulnerability, deference to 
authority can result in exploitation and discrimination that is not met with resistance. Juridic 
and deferential vulnerabilities primarily deal with power and will often occur simultaneously. 
We cannot remove the power imbalance from the organization of the U.S. Military, but 
illuminating points of vulnerability within the hierarchy can inform effective antidiscrimination 
policies. 
SM experience distinct vulnerabilities at different stages in their military careers.  The 
following cases depict three vulnerable stages: 
 
Case 1 
A healthy, 18-year-old young man graduates from high school against the odds of low 
graduation rates and poverty that plague his county. He doesn’t have many career options in his 
community and, after talking to a recruiter, is eager to enlist in the military. He passes the 
physical examination with flying colors. Unfortunately, genetic screening performed on this 
prospective servicemember revealed several red flags and he is deemed ineligible for enlistment 





A successful, mid-career Naval pilot undergoes her annual physical to ensure her fitness 
for duty. A new gene variant was investigated and data suggested an association with impaired 
respiratory performance at high-altitudes. It is of particular interest to the military, so it 
becomes part of the genetic screening process for servicemembers. The test reveals that the 
pilot has the gene variant, and out of concern for her safety despite no evidence in her work 
performance, she is reassigned to a different occupation and forced to retire from flying.  
 
Case 3 
A recently medically-discharged servicemember suffering from kidney problems seeks 
disability benefits from the military. Their condition developed over the course of years of 
service, and they trust the military to assist in paying for treatment and care as they no longer 
have the military-issued TRICARE health insurance. Upon petitioning the military for disability 
benefits, the DoD physician screens for genetic abnormalities and finds a gene variant with 
evidence suggesting a high-risk for kidney disease. The military denies disability benefits to the 
veteran on the grounds that they were predisposed to the kidney condition and cannot prove 
that service was causally responsible.  
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As shown in Table 1, these cases expose different vulnerabilities that are dependent 
upon the stage of military career, and that are exacerbated by the absence of robust genetic 
information protection and nondiscrimination policies. 
 
Table 1. Vulnerability to Genetic Discrimination at Different Stages in U.S. Military Career 
Cases Timepoint Relative to Military 
Service 
Vulnerability to Genetic Discrimination 
Case 1 Pre-military Eligibility 
Case 2 Active-Duty or Reservist Member Occupational Specialty, Reassignment, 
Discharge 
Case 3 Post-military Continuity of TRICARE/health care 
Disability Benefits 
 
In the case of prospective servicemembers, the main threat that genetic screening poses 
is to their eligibility for duty. For active and reservist members, the consequences of genetic 
screening can affect their occupational specialty or result in separation or medical discharge. 
For forced retirement or discharged servicemembers, genetic screening can interfere with 
continuity of health care and prevent the collection of disability benefits. These specific 
vulnerabilities ought to be addressed in a military genetic information protection policy, along 
with vulnerabilities that affect all servicemembers at any stage in their career, such as family 
utilization of genomic medicine (discussed further in Section 7.3-5). Before offering an analysis 
of the particular ethical issues raised by genetic screening in the U.S. Military, I will discuss the 
general ethical obligations the military has to its SM. 
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5. Military Duty to Protect 
The primary function of a military is to engage in combat and to protect, broadly, its 
nation, which can include the nation’s interests, resources, and civilian population. Indeed, DoD 
Instructions permitting waivers of informed consent (section 3.4) forsake the autonomy of SM 
in the interest of national security. At first, it seems intuitive that military institutions should 
strive to protect the lives of SM, as they are also citizens that ought to be protected. However, 
it may not be self-evident what sort of obligations the military has toward its SM. One version 
of a duty to protect argument considers the conclusion, ‘the military is obligated to protect the 
lives of SM.’ The line of argument leading to that conclusions might look something like this: 
 
P1.   A strong military inflicts damaging attacks and minimizes damage from opponent attacks. 
P2.    A military has an interest in being strong.                                                                  
____________________________________________________________________ 
C.   The military is obligated to recruit strong (i.e., healthy) SM (and) do what it can to keep them strong 
and healthy. 
 
This argument focuses on the interests of the military as an institution, asserting that a 
military has an interest in preserving the lives of SM because it is interested in absorbing 
minimal damage and being strong. Unfortunately, this argument does not quite illuminate the 
ethical obligations the Military has to SM in virtue of them being human, or speaking more 
plainly, the military fulfilling duties that are owed. To reach this conclusion, we can restate the 
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argument as, ‘The military has an obligation to protect the life that a SM leads.’ The line of 
argument leading to that conclusion might look something like this: 
 
P1. The SM undertakes a high burden by joining the military. 
P2. The SM is interested in the life they lead. 
P3. The military is extremely demanding in terms of risk and control. 
P4. The SM is owed special entitlements from the military in return for service. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
C. The military has an obligation to protect the life that a SM leads. 
 
Unlike the first argument, the second argument treats SM as ends in themselves and 
centralizes SM interests over military interests in determining ethical obligations. If we accept 
the second argument as valid, we can deliberate and make certain claims on the permissibility 
of mandatory genetic screening in the military. 
 
6. Ethical Implications of Genetic Testing & Screening in the U.S. Military 
 There are several ethical arguments against mandatory genetic testing and screening in 
the U.S. Military in the absence of adequate protections. The first set of arguments concerns 
violations of key ethical principles including autonomy, nonmaleficence, and justice. Additional 




One of the core pillars of bioethics, respect for autonomy is defined as freedom from 
control or constraint, full disclosure of information, and free choice or voluntariness. 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001) Respecting autonomy involves treating individuals as ends in 
and of themselves both providing and honoring choice. The genetic revolution presents to the 
military an opportunity to mitigate the risk of lives of service members in the combat zone by 
gaining insight into personalized health status and predisposition to conditions and diseases. As 
demonstrated in the arguments in Section 5, a strong military will not only have interests in 
strengthening its components, but also prioritize considerations that protect the interests of 
the SM. Preserving autonomy and promoting respect for persons is a form of protection. 
Soldiers sacrifice their lifestyle and risk serious injury or death by participating in the military. 
Such sacrifices entitle them to robust forms of protection from the military institution 
whenever possible.  
The use of genetic information exacerbates the limits on choice that military SM 
experience. This sense of autonomy is more circumscribed within a military structure than is 
typical of autonomy for civilians. Genetic screening is one of the choices SM ought to have. 
Access to genetic information and health information can provide SM with a fuller and more 
detailed account of their physical capabilities in an operational military role. This can enhance 
the SM’s ability to give informed consent, whether that is when a prospective SM is considering 
enlistment or an Active-Duty SM is considering moving to Reservist status. No matter the 
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decision, genetic screening has the ability to provide more information that can be used or 
ignored at the discretion of the SM.  
However, the imposition of mandatory genetic screening in the absence of genetic 
information protection and genetic nondiscrimination policy is problematic and violates 
autonomy. Respecting privacy, confidentiality, and choice preserves the autonomy of an 
individual. There is intense encroachment on privacy, confidentiality, and choice in the military, 
so military institutions ought to rigorously preserve what little privacy, confidentiality, and 
choice that remains. As a consequence of being exempt from having to operate in accordance 
with GINA, the military is permitted to require genetic screening and does not have to adhere 
to any protection of genetic information outlined by GINA. I contend that mandatory genetic 
screening is an unnecessary invasion of privacy, breach of confidentiality, and restriction of 
choice and, therefore, violates the autonomy of SM.  
The military should not be permitted to mandate genetic testing or screening on 
prospective or current active or reserve component service members without robust genetic 
information protection policies in place to guard against genetic discrimination. The 
implications of mandatory genetic screening for autonomy are not unique to military 
personnel. Genetic testing places immense weight on reproductive freedoms and family 
planning decisions and involves potentially critical health information about biological family 
members who did not choose to join the military nor provide consent to learning of their own 
potential for genetic variations via mandatory military genetic testing. Despite the given 
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consent of an individual to undergo a genetic test in order to be eligible for military 
employment, the family has not consented to having that information revealed, breaching their 
autonomy. Genetic tests can provide enormous insight into a person’s health risks but are not 
necessarily a diagnostic tool. Mutations or markers detected in a genetic test may be used to 
diagnose a health condition, but far more often merely report on the probability of developing 
a condition or disease at some point in their lives.  
Probabilities should not be used to determine eligibility for employment or service. 
Being deemed ineligible because one might develop a disease in the future would violate the 
autonomy of healthy people, eager to volunteer their service for an already life-risking 
occupation. Enlisting or becoming an officer in the military is an incredible choice to make, 
regardless of motivation. People volunteer to join the military for a variety of reasons including 
job security, patriotism, family traditions, scholarship, and access to resources such as 
education or health care. Removing that choice by introducing genetic disqualifiers that may 
not be relevant to the individual’s current health status violates respect for persons. 
 
6.2. Beneficence & Nonmaleficence 
Nonmaleficence and beneficence are also relevant to the ethical analysis of mandatory 
genetic screening in the military. Initially introduced by Beauchamp & Childress (1985), 
nonmaleficence encapsulates the doctrine to, ‘do no harm,’ and beneficence captures 
optimization of benefits. Nonmaleficence strictly refers to mitigating unnecessary harms and 
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beneficence refers to promoting benefits whenever possible. These two principles are 
intimately related, but offer distinct additions to this ethical analysis and demand different calls 
to action in policy. 
The power of genetic testing and screening to identify clinically actionable health 
conditions has the potential to save the lives of SM by enhancing safety and preparedness on 
an individual basis.  The information gleaned from this technology can be used to avoid 
unnecessary injury or fatality. Unfortunately, the pairing of mandatory genetic screening with a 
lack of genetic nondiscrimination protection not only fails to promote nonmaleficence and 
beneficence, but violate the principles for several reasons. 
Genetic testing or screening is complicated. Requiring a person to undergo a genetic 
test poses risks not only to that individual’s emotional state, but that of their biological family 
as well. Undue emotional distress can be imposed on a SM and their biological family, violating 
the principle of nonmaleficence. Genetic testing can restrict perfectly eligible candidates from 
an employment opportunity and benefits (such as health care access) or cause unnecessary 
emotional distress.  
Genetic testing or screening may exclude individuals who would otherwise strengthen 
the military, or at the very least eliminating them from participating in the sense of purpose or 
belonging that the military can provide, which violates the principle of beneficence for both the 
individual and the institution.  
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 As mentioned above, the principle of nonmaleficence is related to but not 
interchangeable with beneficence. Nonmaleficence has to do with negative rights, whereas 
beneficence corresponds to positive rights. GINA is a type of negative right (section 2.2). GINA 
prohibits genetic discrimination, but does not entitle people with genetics-based sensitivities to 
accommodations that could improve their work environment, which is especially powerful 
when compared to the success of American’s with Disabilities (1995). This is particularly 
important in the context of using genetic information in the military: ought we impose negative 
rights prohibiting discrimination and misuse of genetic information, or ought we enable access 
to health resources and accommodations? I will explore this question further in Section 8.  
 
6.3. Justice 
 6.3.1. Distributive Justice 
Genetic screening that is currently mandated in the Military place additional burden on 
already marginalized demographics in the US. Gene variants indicating a G6PD-deficiency are 
most commonly found in people of African, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern ancestry. SCT is 
most common in people of African ancestry, it is estimated that about 1 in 13 Black or African-
American babies are born with this trait (CDC, 2020). This dramatically shifts any burden of 
genetic screening onto these populations. This can be alleviated by emphasizing benefit to the 
individual, connecting extra information about a person’s health status with extra protection 
and support. The consequences of emotional distress and occupational specialty repercussions 
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must be minimized in order for the benefit of these genetic screenings to outweigh the burden. 
In order to maximize individual benefit to this sort of information, the only genes that would be 
permissible for screening would be ones with well-researched penetrable gene variants, that 
are clinically actionable, and are situationally relevant (DeCastro, 2016). When these conditions 
are not met, genetic screening is unnecessary and burdensome, unfairly distributing harms 
amongst SM. 
 
 6.3.2. Structural Justice 
Apart from a hierarchical organization in which power imbalance is inevitable, the U.S. 
Military must reckon with structural injustice by enforcing rigorous nondiscrimination 
measures. The military must acknowledge the social determinants and external pressures that 
influence disadvantaged groups to find the military an attractive or the only option at their 
disposal, resulting in an uneven distribution of demographics represented in the service 
member population. In discussing the permissibility of genetic screening in the U.S. Military, it 
matters what sort of genes and gene variants are being screened for, because it raises 
significant justice concerns. 
The use of any genetic disqualifiers in military eligibility can be a slippery slope, paving 
the road to an unjustly homogenous military population. The list of disqualifiers is likely to grow 
as new tests or screens are discovered and made readily available for military use, risking the 
introduction of bias into the sort of gene variants that result in someone being deemed unfit for 
 26 
duty. Such biased tests have the potential to exacerbate the health disparities, influenced by 
social determinants of health, experienced by minority and marginalized populations, such as 
people of color, women, and the LGBTQ+ community. Without protection from GINA, genetic 
disqualifiers can be implemented into the algorithm used for military eligibility, exacerbating 
discrimination and violating the ethical principle of justice. 
 
6.4. Genetic Exceptionalism 
If medical disqualifiers are ethically acceptable in determining military eligibility, then 
why do genetic disqualifiers pose an ethical dilemma? There are two main reasons why we 
ought to treat genetic information differently than other medical information given the 
complicated context of genetics in current society.  
Firstly, the social narrative surrounding genetic and genomic information is 
overwhelmingly deterministic. The use of metaphors to describe the human genome such as, 
“blue print,” or “book of life,” has been well studied, and ultimately convey genes as concrete 
and unchangeable aspects that make up the core of who we are. However, the field of 
epigenetics defies such permanence by asserting that genes themselves undergo a tremendous 
amount of regulation and expression that can be heavily influenced by our behaviors, diets, 
levels of exercise, and even sleep patterns. So, although genes and their variants are not all 
inherently deterministic, society perceives them as such so we ought to approach genetic 
sequencing, testing, and screening carefully and uniquely from other medicine. This is especially 
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important when people confuse diagnostic with predictive genetic testing, which offers only a 
probability or risk that someone may one day develop a medical condition or be vulnerable to 
diseases.  
Secondly, a distinct characteristic of genetic medicine is its innate quality of heritability: 
gene sequencing yields results that impact the entire biological family. This complicates how we 
normally approach consent in medicine and research, as any genetic sequencing, testing, or 
screening may yield information that subjects more than a single individual to certain clinical 
benefits or emotional and financial burdens. This can have implications for responsibilities 
toward people that are not the patients of a provider and permissibility of breaching 
confidentiality. Such a case may arise when a health care professional finds a significant variant 
in the results of a genetic test and ponders the right of at-risk family members to such 
information and the role of the health care provider in divulging that information. For these 
reasons, we are required to treat genetic information with special protections distinct from 
other medical information. 
 
6.5. Omission vs. Commission 
 As previously discussed, the U.S. Military is explicitly exempt from Title II of GINA. The 
decision not to extend protection from genetic discrimination to servicemembers is an act of 
commission and therefore more egregious from an ethical standpoint than if it were an act of 
omission. Some philosophers have argued that the distinction between omission and 
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commission is morally irrelevant, primarily consequentialists who judge the value of a decision 
based on the consequences that follow. However, the motivations behind omission and 
commission are often dissimilar, so we may be resistant to the consequentialist conception of 
omission vs. commission (Spranca et al. 1991). It seems like motivations ought to matter, the 
difference being that omissions are typically brought about in ignorance compared to nefarious 
intentions associated with commission. For example, if Title II of GINA failed to mention the 
standing of the U.S. military or federal employees in its document, allowing legal teams to 
discover a loophole in the wording of GINA that allows for genetic discrimination in the military, 
lack of protection would be the result of omission. Nevertheless, the authors of Title II of GINA 
acknowledged the role of policy protecting SM against genetic discrimination in US military 
employment and explicitly exempts the institution from complying with such standards. 
 
7. Important Considerations in Designing a U.S. Military-specific Genetic Information 
Protection and Nondiscrimination Policy 
 The limitations that emerged from GINA in the wake of passing into law can inform 
future genetic information protection and nondiscrimination policies. Here, I propose six 
important considerations that are critical to the process of developing a military-specific genetic 
information protection and nondiscrimination policy. Weaving these aspects into such a policy 
has the potential to enjoy the benefits of genetic testing and screening and protect autonomy, 
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promote nonmaleficence, and preserve justice in ways that a lack of a protective policy fails to 
accomplish. 
 
7.1. The Sort of Genes We Screen for Matter 
 The sort of genetic variant that is required for screening in the absence of genetic 
information protection and nondiscrimination policy matters from the perspective of justice. 
Without fair protections, the burden of genetic screening repercussions will outweigh the 
benefits of involuntarily uncovered health knowledge. So, the burdens of genetic screening 
ought to be evenly distributed. As we’ve seen, mandating a genetic screen for a variant that is 
predominantly found in people of African heritage shifts the consequences of testing toward 
the African American population. In order to mitigate the burdens of genetic screening and 
distribute the benefits evenly across SM, the gene variants selected for screening ought to be 
penetrant, clinically actionable, and situationally relevant (DeCastro, 2016). These 
characteristics optimize the benefits, and therefore promote beneficence, gained from genetic 
screening and increase the probability that genetic screening for that particular gene variant 
would outweigh the harms. A successful selection of gene variants submitted for regular 





7.2. The Relationship Between Policy and Scientific Validity 
 Anti-discrimination and health care access policy can help inform the threshold of 
validity for medical screens and tests. Screens and tests used to determine the presence of or 
risk for a certain medical condition are scientifically valid if they meet criteria for sensitivity and 
specificity. Sensitivity is defined as the ability of a test to correctly identify individuals who have 
a disease. A test with high sensitivity will minimize false negatives. Specificity is defined as the 
ability of a test to correctly identify individuals who do not have a disease, thereby minimizing 
false positives. The thresholds for specificity and sensitivity can be manipulated depending 
upon the clinical benefits and harms of letting an afflicted patient go untreated versus treating 
a healthy person for a condition they don’t have. The policy surrounding a medical condition 
can help direct the levels of specificity and sensitivity for proposed screens and tests. For 
example, a weak genetic nondiscrimination policy or lack thereof would have more harmful 
repercussions for positive genetic test results, therefore we ought to increase specificity to 
minimize false positives. If a there is a robust genetic nondiscrimination policy in place, patients 
can focus on the therapeutic benefits if a genetic variant is flagged, making increased sensitivity 
a higher priority in order to minimize false negatives.  
 
7.3. Protecting Vulnerabilities 
 Table 1 features vulnerabilities unique to military components throughout different 
stages of a military career. Without a shadow of a doubt, military-specific vulnerabilities to 
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genetic discrimination ought to be confronted in a military-specific genetic nondiscrimination 
policy. That being said, the list of vulnerabilities when it comes to genetic information are not 
exclusive to the information presented in the table. There are significant features to genetic 
information and genetic nondiscrimination that ought to be implemented in a rigorous 
protection policy that are not unique to military components, but do grant the same genetic 
protections enjoyed by civilians. 
 
7.4. Counseling & Education Proposals 
The Military offers a number of educational programs following a positive result in 
either the G6PD or SCT genetic screening. I commend this directive, but recommend that 
counseling accompany any educational proposals. Due to the perceived deterministic nature of 
genetic information, effect on biological family, and reproduction & family planning, it is 
ethically appropriate that disclosure of a positive genetic test result be conducted in the 
presence of or by a genetic counselor. Disclosure of positive results in HIV screenings include 
counseling sessions, so there is an analogous obligation for the military to offer counseling in 
the context of positive genetic screening. 
 
7.5. Protection of Familial Information 
Military personnel are required to disclose medical information that has the potential to 
threaten readiness in the field. As such, a lack of genetic information protection and 
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nondiscrimination policy could dissuade biological family members of the SM from utilizing 
genetic services and personalized medicine. The field of genetics and personalized medicine 
hold great potential for better diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions, and it seems 
impermissible for the lack of a genetic information and nondiscrimination protection policy to 
inhibit non-SM from accessing such services. Therefore, an all-encompassing military-specific 
genetic information and nondiscrimination protection policy should offer an account of how 
familial genetic information and genomic medicine utilization ought not threaten nor be 
threatened by the status of the SM. 
 
7.6. DoD-level Policy 
 Of the many things GINA accomplished, one of them was standardizing the minimal 
protections offered to civilians at a federal level. Many states have their own form of genetic 
protection policy, some weak and some robust. GINA offers a bare minimum level of 
compliance for all relevant entities. I believe something can be learned by this in developing 
genetic protection policies for servicemembers. Each branch may have their own statements or 
standards for genetic information protection, but a policy adopted by the Department of 
Defense that applies to all branches would standardize genetic nondiscrimination. The Army, 
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corp, and Coast Guard all have their own unique cultures and 
overarching responsibilities within the military. However, specific occupations span all 
branches. For example, if the Air Force were to develop robust genetic nondiscrimination 
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against gene variants that affect pilots, such as those influencing performance at high-altitudes, 
pilots in other branches would not share in those protections. Therefore, it would be most 
effective for the Department of Defense to develop, adopt, and implement a rigorous genetic 
nondiscrimination protection policy in order to hold all branches accountable. Through 
collaboration between the branches and active discussion surrounding the vulnerabilities 
presented by servicemembers, a more specific and effective genetic nondiscrimination policy 
can and should be established. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Genetic information can yield insight that may be of importance to individual SM and 
their families.  Policy that supports the provision of genetic testing on penetrant, clinically 
actionable, and relevant variants can promote autonomy and mitigate harms (nonmaleficence).  
If the military determines that genetic testing should be mandatory because the benefits 
outweigh the risks, adequate protections must be in place. The U.S. military currently has the 
authority to make employment decisions on the grounds of genetic information through an 
explicit exemption from GINA without any guidelines surrounding the ethical use of genetic 
information. GINA did not offer suggestions nor guidance as to the implementation of such a 
policy that would be specific to the military branches.  Considering the current practices, 
genetic screening, and medical information policies that reference genetics, there are particular 
vulnerabilities significant to the military that raise significant ethical concerns surrounding 
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mandatory genetic screening. In this respect, it was inappropriate for the US military to be 
exempt from GINA. However, this does provide an opportunity to reframe genetic information 
protections and nondiscrimination in the U.S. Military by using lessons learned from the 
effectiveness of GINA. 
Genetic information is medical information with a deterministic narrative and familial 
implications that ought to be treated with special protections when considering breaches of 
confidentiality, invasion of privacy, and impact on choice. The US military is not held 
accountable to the protections covered in GINA afforded to civilians, which creates potential for 
abuse of that information and instances of genetic discrimination in an already vulnerable 
population. The control the US military has over the lifestyle of servicemembers raises the 
institution to a higher ethical obligation toward their servicemembers than a government may 
owe to their citizens. In order to promote the ethical pillars of autonomy, nonmaleficence, and 
justice, the US military ought to develop and adopt a robust genetic information protection 
policy that is tailored to servicemembers that can be used to determine ethical use or access to 
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